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Comments on the Current and Possible Future Role of the
International Trade Commission and the Canadian Import
Tribunal in the North American Competitive Context
by Gary Horlick*

I'm not going to do any better or give you a better sports metaphor than
simply to observe that we are all assuming that the stadium in which
this game is going to be played is going to be both covered and heated.
Now, neither of those would occur in the Hobbsian state of nature,
which shows you automatically that there is a role for government, or at
least some external force.
That, in fact, is what trade regulation is about. No one is saying
there is no role for government. No one is saying that we should just let
pure market forces occur, because you need monopoly laws, and similar
laws. So what I want to do is to comment; although I have a problem as
commentator because I am finding myself in agreement with virtually
everything all three of the speakers have said, including my fellow commentator. Fortunately, however, since I knew the identity of the three
speakers, I knew that I would be in agreement with all three of them, so I
did bring along a few thoughts of my own.
Reviewing briefly the current situation, despite all of the disputes,
what you have is actually a fairly good agreement between the United
States and Canada on the general principles of government regulation of
international trade. This is not some kind of historic accident. This is
very simply a product of the GATT system. Because of successive
rounds of GATT negotiations, there is actually general agreement on the
main principles. It is a success that is seldom noted; people look at the
exceptions.
Now, there are some differences in administration of those principles between the United States and Canada, as you have heard from Vice
Chairman Brunsdale and Chairman Bertrand. The main differences,
however, and the ones that get most attention are disputes over actual
cases. These are not disputes over principles or over methods of administration. They are disputes over outcomes. You couldn't have a better
example than the one that Chairman Bertrand cited about corn, where
some parts of the United States can become very huffy when Canada
starts applying the same principles to the United States that the United
States has applied frequently to Canada. This is considered a matter of
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great dispute, even though the principles are the same. In fact, I would
observe that in the evaluation of subsidies, Canada was probably more
conservative in evaluating the subsidies than the United States would be
in a comparable Canadian case. The number would have been higher
had the United States investigated the same Canadian programs-not by
much, but by a little. Now, what you have are some differences, but
below that, general agreement on principles, so we have to look at those
principles just a little bit.
The basic problem is, as Vice Chairman Brunsdale pointed out, that
you have these GATT definitions-this is a perceptive point. The only
real definitions of unfairness attached to dumping and subsidies is very
simply that there is no requirement of compensation. When you get below that surface, you quickly find out-I think most businessmen tell me
that-the definitions of dumping, for example, are quite outmoded.
Just briefly, dumping is selling for less in one market than another.
The unfairness of that is questionable, but it is certainly a different kettle
of fish than when tariffs average 20 or 30%; and if one wiped out all
tariffs, as is contemplated by the intrepid negotiators, query why you
would have the differential pricing, except perhaps for commodities that
are extremely transportation intensive.
The definitions of countervailing probably make more sense to the
extent that they are followed and they are similar for both the United
States and Canada, if you read the relevant decisions. There is a very
important point which is made in Chairman Bertrand's paper. It is that
the failure of the United States, and actually somewhat of Canada, to
look at the true net benefits of subsidies. What you are looking at is a
gross subsidy without a true economic accounting of the total favorable
impact.
My guess is this would usually reduce the levels of countervailing
duties, although in some cases it would raise them, if you looked at the
true economic measure. I don't want to pursue that point too much further; as a former administrator, I can assure you it is impossible to do
within any time frame assigned by any legislation. Now, there is also this
interesting question about some differences in the definition of injury between the United States and Canada. Again, with all due respect to the
respective tribunals, injury, unlike dumping or subsidization, will always
be in the eye of the beholder. That's always going to be a problem and
there will always be differences, as with horse races, because you
wouldn't have any betting on a horse race if there weren't differences of
opinion.
So I'm not sure that there's much you can do in tinkering with the
standards that is ever going to remove disputes over the results. There is,
in my view, an interesting problem raised by Vice Chairman Brunsdale
about the way that the U.S. administration of these laws is split and I'm
curious if it is true in Canada. As she pointed out, the ITC can only
investigate the margins of dumping or the amounts of subsidization that
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Commerce gives them. In practice this means that some things do fall
between the cracks.
For example, the U.S. statute requires that material injury occur by
reason of the dumped imports and yet the ITC, in practice, doesn't have
a very good handle on which imports are dumped and which are not.
Again, there are some obvious administrative problems, but logically and
frequently, for example, Commerce will find that about 60% of the imports are dumped at an average dumping margin of 40%. Commerce
will then report that there is a weighted average dumping margin of

24%.
The ITC cannot actually get down and examine each importer
(although Commerce already has for six months) to figure out which are
dumping and which are not. In theory they should only be looking at the
effect of the dumped imports, but in practice it just doesn't occur.
I think there could be better coordination. Proposals have been
made to have a single agency. I think there is a lot to be said for that,
although there are some difficulties. It is an interesting example of how
administrative structures can have an effect on substance; while not particularly one that is embedded in the law. For all I know it is true in
Canada as well. It's not something that people intentionally do. It is
inevitable.
I think the suggestion that Vice Chairman Brunsdale made, that
both sides should adapt the best of each other's practices, would be an
excellent one. My personal view is that the Canadian Import Tribunal's
procedures have a better way of finding truth than our own ITC. This
may be a lawyer's reaction, because lawyers in Canada and the United
States have this fondness for the adversarial process as a way of testing
truth.
By contrast, many Canadians complain about the relative closeness
of review in Canada. That has changed a lot in the last few years under
the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) and perhaps it would be helpful if the administrations on both sides of both of these issues got together more and exchanged experiences. Oddly enough, there is
precedent for this. You will see a convergence of practice between the
United States, Canada, the EEC and even Australia as a result of the
GATT committees.
There are codes, anti-dumping codes and subsidy codes, and people
meet every six months to discuss them. I was quite interested to find that
this led to increasing convergence of practice, not because it was required
by the codes, but because you simply met once every six months with
people who had the same set of problems. If the United States had a
completely novel issue in a dumping case or a countervailing duty case,
who else would I call? Who else would the U.S. administrator call?
There is no one else who could have possibly faced that problem, except
for one person in Ottawa and one in Brussels, so you call them or you

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:209 1987

run into them at meetings. It is an interesting example, again, of the fact
of having this structure, not because of legal compulsion, but because it
has created a great deal of convergence. It is very noticeable among everyone that has been involved in these.
Committees under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) could well
have some of the same effects. I want to turn now then to this FTA in
this vision of the future. A point made by Jon Fried is very important.
The reason for having an FTA is basically to provide rules for investors.
There are trade disputes, but essentially what you are doing in the long
run is setting up rules that allow investors to figure out what to do, what
kind of plants they want to build, where they can sell, and so on. You
are setting up rules that you are going to tell someone today where they
can sell in ten years and under what conditions. That's the purpose of
government, as I say, to provide this nice, heated, covered dome stadium,
but then to not intervene, except to prevent the teams from literally killing each other.
In this point, I do get to use a sports metaphor. I reject this perfectly level playing field. The fact of the matter is the playing field will
not be level; just as, for example, in a football match, the side that gets
the wind is determined by a coin flip. There are random events that
governments and businesses can't control and they are not all the result
of someone else's unfairness. They are just life. Businesses have to plan
for those, but governments are not supposed to be part of this problem.
They are supposed to be part of the solution.
The purpose of these rules is to provide a stable environment, not
one where the rules change every year so you cannot plan your business.
Thus a stable environment is crucial for a FTA. That's the first point.
The second point which derives from that is an assumption; because both
of our countries run essentially on a neoclassical economic set of models,
if we provide this stable environment, our businessmen on both sides will
go out and do a better job. There will be more investment, more growth
in the economies. We will all live better. This will help both of our
countries' positions in world markets.
Now, in theory, the secondary effect of this negotiation is to provide
a model and this has obviously been high on the U.S. agenda. The
dumping standards and countervailing duty standards are far from perfect. The United States and Canada have a better chance than any other
two countries possibly in the world to sit down and come up with rules
that make sense; that is in the sense of letting business go about its business. That's why this is such a temptation for both countries.
Let me turn now to specifics about what you would do in the longterm. I'm going to focus on the contingency protection issue. As a longterm matter, you essentially are looking for equal treatment. A Canadian business doing business in the United States would be treated no
differently than a U.S. business doing business in the United States and
vise versa. I would suggest that this raises serious questions for busi-
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nessmen on both sides. They better realize the impact that would mean
eliminating the anti-dumping laws as they apply to imports from the
other country.
Canadian imports into the United States and U.S. imports into Canada would be treated under existing competition policy. Eventually you
would want to look at one market for the purpose of evaluating that
competition. There are some interesting problems, because you would
not have a common external tariff as the EEC does. So getting to a longterm goal of a single market might be a problem for the antitrust lawyers.
Certainly you would eliminate the anti-dumping laws as they apply
to both sides; this is a serious question for both United States law and
Canadian business. Implementation may be politically difficult; you
would eliminate section 337 and section 232, which is national security,
of the U.S. law, as it applies to Canada. Again, you would only have
recourse to domestic intellectual property rights in both countries. Section 232 actually never affects Canada, but it should not be around as a
threat. Anyhow, the United States and Canada operate as one joint defense protection base.
You would eliminate safeguards as they apply to both countries, because you would not have searches from outside. You are talking about
one market, so in the end you simply wouldn't have safeguards. Again,
this is a problem because you need common safeguards, assuming you
would want safeguards at all, under the GATT against third countries.
Finally, you would get rid of (distortive) subsidies, but who am I
kidding? Subsidies exist because there are politicians who are democratically elected. They spread subsidies thinly over every writing in Canada
and every congressional district in the United States, so you are not going
to eliminate subsidies. That's why even in the long run you are going to
have some sort of either discipline or countervailing duties. It is a given.
So as a long-term matter, you are going to have some sort of joint
tribunal with binding powers either to eliminate the subsidy or impose a
countervailing duty. I note Chairman Bertrand's suggestion of the need
to look at import displacing effects of subsidies as well. They are not
limited to export enhancing. That's the long-term future and what I
would like to do very briefly at the end here is to look at some of the
immediately attainable goals.
Immediately attainable goals require that some substantive changes
be made. I don't want to go into great detail on them, but there are a
large number of things for which the United States and Canadian businesses can jointly go out and lobby so as to reduce the harassment value
of these cases. Just to give you an example, you can require that standing
be shown affirmatively by petitioning industries. You could refuse to initiate cases where the offending import from the other country between
the United States and Canada has less than 1% of the market.
There have been cases, certainly in the United States and probably
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in Canada, where the relevant import from Canada or the United States
was tiny. The real target was someone else. You can say that injury can
never be found since less than half of the industry refused to answer the
relevant questionnaire; this occurs with fair frequency. You could, for
example, agree on distinct principles of what is countervailable and what
isn't countervailable. I believe that is likely to happen.
The principles aren't too far apart and you can simply raise the de
minimis standard. Right now the United States will apply subsidy or
dumping margin if it is over five percent. Very few businessmen I have
encountered who have "won a case" by getting a margin in their favor of
six percent think they have won anything. It is just not worth it, so you
probably could raise that to two or three percent and, again, eliminate a
lot of the harassment notion. That I note, as opposed to the import penetration level, would require a full investigation.
One proposal is to adopt a differential subsidy approach. One of the
fascinating things U.S./Canadian countervailing duty cases is that almost
invariably the petitioning industry is subsidized. This isn't surprising,
because the industrial structures are substantially similar or similar
enough that an industry on one side of the border is likely to have extorted the same kinds of subsidies as is true on the other side of the border. If you go through the list of U.S and Canadian countervailing duty
cases, it is likely you will find the petitioner was subsidized and is claiming unfair subsidies.
There's a long laundry list of those little things. The last thing is
what you can do immediately on some sort of dispute resolution and Jon
Fried has gone through that very well. Let me just give a few thoughts.
First, you have to have private access. This has long been a bugaboo, as
most of you know, in international law. With the exception of a few
human rights commissions, there is basically no private access. Thus you
are going to need private access to make the FTA meaningful. Businesses on either side of the border shouldn't have their access to some
sort of decision controlled solely by their governments.
One proposal of which private businesses are always fond is some
sort of private dispute resolution that can be done within antitrust laws;
laws about which there is occasional insensitivity. I don't know if that's
feasible, but there is something to be said for a weeding out process,
whether it is done privately or at an initial stage with governments. The
reason why is that a lot of the cases between the two countries simply
aren't worth the trouble.
The United States recently imposed duties on $200,000 worth of Canadian flowers. Canada wasn't the target. It was Columbia, the Netherlands, and maybe Israel. Canada just got swept in. Those sorts of cases
certainly aren't worth the trouble and perhaps some sort of weeding out
process can get rid of those cases. Again, the second aspect is the importance of private access. Most likely, the parties will have recourse to
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their national laws first as a short-term matter; however, you need a binationally binding final decision.
The reason for this problem is not the principles; it isn't really their
application in most cases; it is a perception that the process can be altered by one country or another. If the United States and Canada really
are going to undertake the kind of joint economic effort that this agreement implies, you will need binational decisions on what is a subsidy,
what is injury and things like that. There has to be some recourse to a
binational decision.
The recent softwood lumber case is a perfect example. The problem, very simply, was the perception that the United States could decide
what was a subsidy on political grounds. Basically you are talking about
a marriage: if both sides don't trust each other then it will be a wrenching situation. Even some sort of binational binding dispute resolution
between the two countries on those issues looks short-term.
Lastly, the method of dispute resolution has to be effective. Effective does not mean that you get the decision two years later; effective
means that you get the decision as part of the actual dispute. You can't
wait two years to find out whether you are going to impose $600,000,000
in duties. With all that said, this is all one long lead-in to the panel on
dispute resolution that I think we are all looking forward to later today.

